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This paper analyzes the strikingly different response of unemployment to the Great Recession 
in France and Spain. Their labor market institutions are similar and their unemployment rates 
just before the crisis were both around 8%. Yet, in France, unemployment rate has increased 
by 2 percentage points, whereas in Spain it has shot up to 19% by the end of 2009. We assess 
what part of this differential is due to the larger gap between the dismissal costs of permanent 
and temporary contracts and the less restrictive rules regarding the use of the latter contracts 
in Spain. Using a calibrated search and matching model, we estimate that about 45% of the 
surge in Spanish unemployment could have been avoided had Spain adopted French 
employment protection legislation before the crisis started. 
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The goal of this paper is to explain the strikingly diﬀerent response of Spanish unemploy-
ment relative to France, during the so-called Great Recession triggered by the ﬁnancial
and economic crisis in 2007-08. We focus on a comparison with France because both
economies share similar labor market institutions (employment protection legislation, un-
employment beneﬁts, wage bargaining, etc.) and exhibited very similar unemployment
rates, around 8%, just before the crisis started. However, while the French unemployment
rate has only risen to 10% during the slump, Spanish unemployment —after falling from
22% in 1994 to 8% in 2007, when Spain was creating a large share of all new jobs in the
European Union (EU)— has surged to 19% by the end of 2009. Our main contribution
in this paper is to analyze which part of this very diﬀerent response can be attributed
to what we identify as the main diﬀerence between the labor market regulations of these
two economies: a larger gap between the dismissal costs of workers with permanent and
temporary contracts and a much laxer regulation on the use of temporary contracts in
S p a i nt h a ni nF r a n c e . W ea r g u et h a tt h e s ed i ﬀerences, often ignored in cross-country
comparisons of overall employment protection legislation (EPL hereafter), could explain
up to 45% of the much higher rise of Spanish unemployment.
France and Spain allow us to tell an interesting tale of two neighboring countries. Both
are among those EU economies which most decidedly promoted temporary contracts in
t h ep a s tt oa c h i e v eh i g h e rl a b o rm a r k e tﬂexibility. Creating a two-tier labor market is
often seen as a politically viable way of achieving this goal when there is great resistance
from protected insider workers (see Saint-Paul, 1996 and 2000). However, temporary
employment is much more important in Spain, reaching around one-third of employees
until recently, whereas this share has been slightly below 15% in France. Therefore it seems
natural to ask whether the markedly diﬀerent unemployment impact of the recession is
due to this diﬀerence, controling for other potential explanatory factors.
To explore these issues, following previous work by Blanchard and Landier (2002) and
Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002), we propose a search and matching model with endoge-
nous job destruction à la Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) which allows for the distinction
between permanent and temporary jobs. In our model, ﬁrms can oﬀer both types of
contracts subject to diﬀerent EPL, and the latter can be transformed into permanent
contracts at their expiration, the rest being terminated at low or no cost at all. It is now
1well understood that facilitating the creation of temporary jobs promotes job creation but
increases job destruction, leading to an ambiguous eﬀect on unemployment. However, one
result that has drawn less attention in this strand of the literature is that the increase
in job destruction induced by temporary jobs may have a larger adverse impact on un-
employment when the gap in ﬁring costs in favor of permanent contracts is high enough.
The higher is this gap, the lower will be the proportion of temporary jobs transformed
into permanent jobs, because much larger ﬁring costs for the latter induce employers to
use temporary jobs in sequence, especially if restrictions on their use are mild, rather than
converting them into long-term contracts. This implies that facilitating a widespread use
of ﬂexible temporary contracts is more likely to raise unemployment in labor markets
already regulated by stringent permanent job security provisions.
The issue that labor market volatility increases with the introduction of ﬂexible tem-
porary jobs has been stressed by Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) and Boeri and Garibaldi
(2007), who argue that two-tier labor market reforms have a transitional honeymoon, job-
creating eﬀect which typically precedes reductions in employment as a result of temporary
workers’ lower labor productivity. Deepening this line of research, Sala et al. (2009) and
Costain et al. (2010) have recently studied the cyclical properties of dual labor markets
subject to limitations on the use of temporary contracts. In particular, they explore
whether ﬂexibility at the margin is the reason why labor markets with a relatively high
degree of EPL may display similar volatility as fully ﬂexible ones. While Sala et al. (2009)
ﬁnd that this partial ﬂexibility leads to an intermediate situation, in terms of unemploy-
ment volatility, between fully regulated and fully deregulated labor markets, Costain et
al. (2010), focusing on the Spanish case, estimate that unemployment ﬂuctuates 22%
more in the prevailing dual labor market than it would in a uniﬁed economy with a sin-
gle contract. In common with these authors, our approach focuses on the interactions
between aggregate productivity shocks and EPL, including the regulation of temporary
jobs. However, while their work focuses on labor market dynamics over the business cycle
following a sequence of shocks, ours relies exclusively on a single shock which captures a
particularly relevant event, as is the case of the Great Recession. This simpler approach
has the advantage of enabling us to be more precise about the role played by speciﬁc
features of labor contracts that can account for the strikingly diﬀerent response of France
and Spain to this global crisis.
From this perspective, our model diﬀers from those of Sala et al. (2009) and Costain
2et al. (2010) in three main respects. First, they assume that temporary jobs can be
destroyed at any time. However, since regulations impose that temporary jobs cannot
be destroyed before their date of termination, which is deﬁned when the job is created,
our model accounts for this feature. Second, we assume that time is needed to destroy
permanent jobs, whereas they assume that these jobs can be instantly destroyed.1 Our
assumption is consistent with regulations which impose advance notice and induce delays
in job destruction due to the time needed to settle legal disputes. Third, we also diﬀer
in how wage bargaining is modeled. In contrast with these authors, we do not assume
that employers have to pay ﬁring costs if they do not agree on the initial wage contract
once they are matched with a worker. Instead, we assume that ﬁring costs are paid
when workers and employers separate only if a contract has already been signed. As
Ljungqvist (2002) has shown, assuming that ﬁring costs are paid by the employer if there
is a separation in the initial bargain —when the job starts— magniﬁes the impact of ﬁring
costs on unemployment. We think that our assumption is more plausible and it captures
better the institutions of France and Spain, where labor contracts are renegotiated by
mutual agreement (Malcomson, 1999; Cahuc et al., 2006).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We start by documenting in Section 2
the relative performance of the French and Spanish labor markets during the crisis vis-à-
vis the preceding expansion. In Section 3 we present the main features of the regulations
aﬀecting these two labor markets, devoting special attention to the EPL gap between
permanent and temporary contracts, and discuss how strong duality in labor markets can
aﬀect sectoral specialization, labor mobility, and mismatch. In Section 4, we introduce a
stylized search and matching model focusing on equilibrium behavior of ﬁrms and workers
in an economy with both temporary and permanent contracts, where it is possible to
transform the former into the latter. In Section 5, we start by analyzing the extent to
which our calibrated model, with each country maintaining their respective prevailing
institutions before the slump, can account for the change in the performance of their
labor markets from the boom (represented by 2005-2007) to the recession (2008-2009),
following a common adverse shock aﬀecting both economies. We then compute the share
of the rise in Spanish unemployment during the crisis which is due to diﬀerences in EPL
with France by running counterfactual simulations on how it would have fared had Spain
adopted French EPL before the recession started. Section 6 concludes.
1 Garibaldi (1998) incorporated advance notice in a model with endogenous job destruction.
32 Labor market performance before and during the
crisis
As depicted in Figure 1, France and Spain had an unemployment rate of 3.8% at the end
of 1976. From then on, both rates rose in tandem but the Spanish rate was always on top
and showed much higher volatility. The diﬀerence increased up until the end of 1994 and
shrank thereafter. By the end of 2005, the two unemployment rates seemed to have come
full circle, reaching similar values around 8%. Convergence was however a mirage. Since
the onset of the worldwide recession, unemployment in Spain has shot up from 8% to 19%
while French unemployment kept on falling, to 7.2%, and then has grown to 9.3%. In
t h er e s to ft h i ss e c t i o n ,w eb r i e ﬂy discuss some potential explanations for this strikingly
diﬀerent response.
Table 1 presents a few key labor-market magnitudes from 1998:1 to 2007:4, an expan-
sion, and 2008:1-2009:4, a recession. It becomes apparent that, throughout the boom,
both labor force and employment growth rates have been much higher in Spain. It is the
Spanish ﬁgures that are remarkable, while the French ones are typical of the euro area
experience. While the share of foreigners in the French labor force was stable, the labor
force in Spain received a boost from large immigration ﬂows amounting to around 1% of
the population per year, and also from an increase in the female labor participation rate
—for natives that rate increased by 8.4 percentage points (pp.) against 2.9 pp. in France.2
Focusing on private sector employees, it can be observed that the employment surge in
Spain stems especially from construction and market services (8.1% and 6.8% per year,
respectively). The corresponding ﬁgures were more moderate in France, including a fall
in manufacturing employment. The disparity was reinforced by the behavior of working
hours per employee: the implementation of the 35 hours law caused a signiﬁcant drop in
France, while they were stable in Spain
In the downturn, growth in the French labor force has hardly altered, while in Spain it
has experienced a signiﬁcant slowdown. France has suﬀered a small employment fall (0.3%
p.a.), though much more in terms of private sector employees (1.6%), which is dwarfed
by the Spanish free fall (4.6% p.a.), especially in the private sector (5.7%). The latter
stems especially from a collapse of almost 20% p.a. (i.e. 36% in total) of employment in
construction and a 10.8% drop in manufacturing.
2See Bentolila et al. (2008a) for a discussion of immigration ﬂows in Spain.
4As discussed earlier, it is very hard to explain the extreme volatility in the Spanish
labor market without recourse to the prevailing types of contracts. As shown in Table 1,
temporary contracts in 1998 represented almost 14% of employees in France and 33% in
Spain. During the expansionary period 1998-2007, the vast majority of (quarterly) ﬂows
from unemployment to salaried employment were under these contracts: 78.4% in France
and 87.2% in Spain. Correspondingly, they also represented the majority of employment
outﬂows, in particular (from administrative sources): 88% in France and 80.1% in Spain.
Consequently, the brunt of job losses since the end of 2007 has been borne by temporary
jobs: 277.000 net jobs where destroyed in France, while actually 324.000 temporary jobs
disappeared, while the corresponding ﬁgures for Spain are simply stunning: 1.33 and 1.38
million jobs, respectively.
Table 1 also shows that the share of temporary jobs in Spain has slightly decreased,
from 33% to 31%, between 1998 and 2007. One may wonder how this matches with the
idea that the drop in unemployment is a result of the spread of temporary jobs over this
expansionary period. There are two explanations for this fact. On the one hand, this was
a very long expansion where Spanish GDP was growing at an average annual rate of 3.7%.
As pointed out by Wasmer (1999), such a long expansionary phase induces a so-called
capitalization eﬀect whereby high growth increases future proﬁts and thus strengthens
ﬁrms’ incentives to increasingly oﬀer permanent contracts so as to retain their workers.
On the other hand, the Spanish government passed a labor reform in 1997 aiming to reduce
the severance pay gap between permanent and temporary contracts. They did so through
two new policy measures: a new type of permanent contract with lower severance pay
(see next Section), unavailable for males aged 31-44 years old unemployed for less than
one year, and the introduction of severance pay of 8 days of wages upon termination
of temporary and interim contracts (previously there was none). The 1997 reform also
included generous social security contribution rebates for hiring under the new permanent
contracts. Thus, in principle, the latter became more attractive. However, these changes
induced a very small drop in the rate of temporary employment, since the lower severance
pay does not apply to unfair dismissals for disciplinary reasons (e.g. worker misconduct),
which are the ones often employed by ﬁrms to avoid long and uncertain legal disputes
on the reason for the dismissals (see below). Therefore, even for these less-protected
contracts, ﬁrms ended up paying a high severance pay.3
3Indeed, Garcia-Perez and Rebollo (2009) document that, in practice, most ﬁrms use this contract
53 Labor institutions in France and Spain
In this section, the institutional settings of the French and Spanish labor markets are
brieﬂy reviewed. We focus on EPL, unemployment beneﬁts and wage bargaining. We
argue that the main diﬀerence arises from the higher EPL gap between permanent and
temporary workers in Spain than in France. Finally, we examine labor mobility, which we
document to be much lower in Spain, partly as a result of the high uncertainty associated
with the use of temporary contracts and the low conversion rates to permanent ones
induced by the large EPL gap.
3.1 Employment protection
As mentioned earlier, France and Spain are among the countries where governments have,
through their regulations, more strongly promoted temporary contracts to increase labor
market ﬂexibility aimed at reducing unemployment.
Table A1 in the Appendix presents the key features of regulations concerning dis-
missals in the two countries. Permanent contracts are subject to advance notice periods
and severance pay.4 Severance pay for economic reasons in France is equal to 6 days
of wages per year of service (the latter clause is understood hereafter) plus 0.08 extra
days for tenure above 10 years. In Spain that pay is equal to 20 days, whereas severance
pay for unfair dismissal is equal to 45 days. From these ﬁgures it may seem that ﬁring
permanent employees is much cheaper in France than in Spain, but this would be mislead-
ing, since there are additional important components of ﬁring costs beside severance pay.
For example, in France, as soon as a worker reaches a 2-year seniority the notice period
doubles, while in Spain most ﬁrms avoid it in exchange for a much higher severance pay.
Likewise, administrative approval is required for collective dismissals in Spain (roughly
those involving 10% of an establishment’s staﬀ), which is almost impossible to obtain
without worker representatives’ agreement to the dismissal in advance (again in exchange
for higher severance pay).
to pocket the subsidy, usually dismissing the employee under the standard procedure, as soon as the
minimum job duration required by law is reached.
4In France, this includes the regular permanent contract or contrat à durée indeterminée (CDI) and
the new employment contract (contrat nouvelles embauches, CNE, which has diﬀerent severance pay
and other conditions) introduced in 2005 for small ﬁrms (see Cahuc and Carcillo, 2006). In Spain it
includes both regular permanent contracts and the subsidized contrato indeﬁnido de fomento del empleo
In principle, the latter has lower severance pay but, as argued above, in fact most dismissals incur the
penalty rate for unfair dismissals.
6Computing overall measures of EPL is not an easy task. Let us consider the widely
used OECD (2004) index of the strictness of EPL for 2003, which ranges from 0 to 6, with
higher scores indicating stricter regulation. This indicator gives a score of 2.5 for France
and 2.6 for Spain regarding protection of permanent jobs, 3.6 for France and 3.5 for Spain
on regulation of temporary jobs, and 2.1 for France and 3.1 for Spain on regulation of
collective dismissals. The overall EPL score is 3.0 for France and 3.1 for Spain (where
the US has the lowest value, 0.7, and Portugal and Turkey the highest, 4.3). Hence,
both countries are ranked in the middle-high range, with Spain appearing only slightly
more regulated than France. However, there are good reasons to think that this average
EPL index, based on legal regulations and not on their implementation, does not capture
Spanish EPL satisfactorily. As argued below, de facto EPL of temporary jobs is much
weaker in Spain than in France, whereas the opposite holds for EPL of permanent jobs.
Moreover, economic theory on the eﬀects of ﬁring costs on employment tells us that
w h a tm a t t e r si sn o ts e v e r a n c ep a yper se, which is a transfer from the ﬁrm to the worker
and may therefore be compensated for in the wage bargain (Lazear, 1990). Rather, since
the probability that workers will contest dismissals is very high, what matter are other
costs that are not appropriated by ﬁrms and workers but are generated by third agents,
such as labor courts and labor authorities, i.e., the so-called red-tape costs. For example,
severance pay oﬀered by ﬁrms in exchange for a quick resolution of dismissals in France is
typically higher than statutory severance or that agreed in collective bargains. In Spain,
the extra cost does not only apply to collective dismissals but also to individual ones.
In eﬀect, since ﬁr m st h a tg ot oc o u r tl o s ei n3o u to f4c a s e so na v e r a g e ,t h e yt y p i c a l l y
ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to allege disciplinary reasons even if they think that dismissals are
justiﬁed on economic grounds. Proceeding in this way they do not need to satisfy the
notice period and, upon immediately acknowledging the dismissal to be unfair, they avoid
going to court by paying upfront the penalty of 45-days severance pay.5 In applying our
theoretical model to these two labor markets, we adopt a conservative strategy and only
focus on the distortionary eﬀect of the ﬁring tax component of severance pay. Accordingly,
we will use estimated red-tape costs which, as will be discussed in Section 5.2, turn out
to be 50% higher in Spain than in France, though the notice period is much shorter, an
EPL feature also accounted for in our calibrated model.
5This option has been available to ﬁrms in Spain since the Law 45/2002 was passed and it implies
severance payments of 45 days of wages per year of service, with a maximum of 42 months’ wages.
7Further, the use of temporary contracts is rather more limited in France than in Spain.6
In France, they can only be used in nine speciﬁc cases: for replacing an employee who is
absent or temporarily working part time, to transitorily replace an employee whose job is
either going to be suppressed or ﬁlled by another permanent worker, and for temporary
increases in the ﬁrm’s activity, seasonal activities, and jobs in certain sectors (forestry,
naval, entertainment, teaching, survey-making, professional sports, etc.). In Spain, tem-
porary contracts may be used for objective reasons (speciﬁc work, accumulation of tasks,
replacement, etc.), for training, to hire disabled workers, and to cover the part of the
working day left uncovered by an employee close to retirement. De facto,h o w e v e r ,t h e r e
are no restrictions: employers are hardly monitored by the authorities to ensure that they
comply with the alleged reasons for hiring under temporary contracts. Finally, while in
both countries the maximum duration of temporary contracts is 24 months, uncertain-
completion jobs (e.g., in the much more prominent construction sector in Spain before
the crisis) may lawfully last for an indeterminate period.
In sum, the previous discussion points out that, in contrast with OECD rankings, EPL
for permanent contracts is more stringent in Spain than in France, while the opposite is
true for temporary contracts. Thus overall EPL may look similar but this aggregate
indices hide the fact that the gap in EPL between the two types of contracts turns out to
be much higher in Spain.7,8
3.2 Unemployment beneﬁts
Unemployment insurance in France features a gross replacement ratio of 57.4% of the
preceding year’s wage.9 In Spain, the replacement ratio decreases over time: it is 70%
for the ﬁrst 6 months and drops to 60% thereafter. Thus, at least at the beginning of
6In this paper we use the term “temporary contracts” to denote all sorts of non-permanent contracts.
We focus on ﬁxed-term contracts, captured by the contrat a duration determinée (CDD) in France and
the contrato temporal in Spain. There are several types of temporary contracts in Spain. And other non-
permanent jobs exist in France, such as temporary jobs proper (emploi interimaire or emploi temporaire).
Moreover, in both countries there are also jobs intermediated by temporary work agencies and most
apprenticeship contracts are temporary as well. Empirically we shall consider all of these as temporary
contracts.
7For more speciﬁc details on the level and structure of ﬁring costs in France, see Cahuc and Postel-
Vinay (2002) and Cahuc and Carcillo (2006), and Bentolila and Jimeno (2006) and Bentolila et al. (2008b)
for Spain.
8A labor market reform has been approved in Spain in September 2010, which has altered severance
pay for permanent and temporary contracts. This reform is however outside the period we examine and
its eﬀects will only be felt over time.
9Or, if it is higher, 40.4% of the wage plus a ﬁxed amount (currently around 330 euros per month).
8unemployment spells, the Spanish system looks more generous than the French one. In
comparing beneﬁts, however, it is crucial to take into account personal characteristics and
to consider replacement rates net of taxes. Thus, according to the OECD Beneﬁts and
Wages database (March 2006 update), the net replacement rate in 2004 for an average
production worker who was married, whose partner did not work, and who had no children
was equal to 69% in both countries. Likewise, if the same worker was married with a
working partner and had two children, again the replacement rates do not diﬀer much:
84% in France and 87% in Spain.
In France, the length of beneﬁts is the same as the worker’s contribution period, with
a maximum duration of 23 months (and higher for workers older than 50 years old). In
Spain, beneﬁt length increases in steps that imply durations going from 22% to one-third of
the contribution period, which has to be of at least 12 months, with a maximum duration
of 24 months. In computing a measure of unemployment beneﬁts for our simulations we
take into account statutory beneﬁts and coverage, which is aﬀe c t e db yd u r a t i o nr u l e s .
Workers who exhaust unemployment insurance or are ineligible for it are entitled to
so-called “minimum integration income” (Revenu Minimum d’Insertion, RMI) in France,
amounting to €454.63 (the minimum wage net of social contribution for full time work-
ers being equal to €1,042) and €681.9 for a couple (plus child beneﬁts).10 In Spain, the
assistance beneﬁt is equal to 80% of the so-called “Multi-Purpose Public Income Indi-
cator”, which in 2008 amounted to €413.5 (around 23% of gross earnings in the private
non-agricultural sector), with higher beneﬁts for workers with family responsibilities. It is
means-tested at the level of the beneﬁt. Additional welfare beneﬁts are available in some
regions (for example in Madrid they amount to €370) but coverage is typically low.
3.3 Wage bargaining
Collective wage bargaining is similar in the two countries. It can be argued that this
is the result of Spain adopting French regulations in the early 1980s, when the post-
dictatorship Spanish system of collective bargaining was established. In both countries,
most workers are covered by collective bargaining, above 90% in France and above 80%
in Spain. Bargaining takes place mostly at the industry level and there is geographical
10The RMI was replaced, as of the third quarter of 2009, by the Revenue de Solidarité Actives (rSa).
There is another scheme equivalent to the RMI (also open to those above 25 years old who never worked)
for those who have worked before and are not eligible anymore: the Allocation de Solidarité Speciﬁque
(ASS), with an amount equivalent to the RMI.
9fragmentation (through industry-department agreements in France and industry-province
agreements in Spain). Conditions set in above ﬁrm-level agreements are extended to all
ﬁrms and workers in the relevant industry or geographical area; extension is discretionary
in France and automatic in Spain.
In Spain, workers are represented by worker delegates in ﬁrms with less than 50 em-
ployees and by worker committees in ﬁrms with more than 50 employees, reﬂecting French
practice. Unions obtain representation from ﬁrm-level elections, where voters need not be
unionized. Thus, there is little incentive for workers to unionize, so that union density is
very low but largely irrelevant. Both countries have the highest gaps between the coverage
of collective bargaining and union density (in 2007 the latter was equal to 8% in France
and 14.6% in Spain, see Visser, 2009).11 One diﬀerence, though, is that whereas in Spain
there are only two nationally representative unions (CCOO and UGT), in France there
are eight unions. Nonetheless, they are not equally powerful and, like in Spain, two unions
are especially inﬂuential, particularly in the public sector (CGT and CDFT). Lastly, it
is worth noting that, although the monthly statutory minimum wage is quite higher in
France than in Spain (1,321 and 728 euros in 2009, respectively; Eurostat), the Kaitz ratio
(i.e., the ratio between the minimum and the average wage) is not very diﬀerent (41% and
50% respectively). Moreover, fewer full-time workers receive the minimum wage in Spain
(about 5% and 18%, respectively) because wage ﬂoors are often determined in collective
bargaining above the statutory level.
In sum, we believe that the two countries are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in their wage
setting institutions and therefore we do not explore any potential diﬀerences in this di-
mension in the simulations below.
3.4 Mismatch, sectoral specialization and labor mobility
Besides the EPL gap, labor mobility is the other dimension in which the French and
Spanish labor markets diﬀer.12 This diﬀerence does not become apparent in job mobility,
which turns out to be rather similar: average job duration is equal to 7.6 years in France
and 8.2 in Spain, while the fractions of workers who have changed job in the preceding
10 years are 49% and 50%, respectively.13
11For more details regarding Spain see Bentolila and Jimeno (2006).
12We are very grateful to Etienne Wasmer for suggesting that we take this issue into account.
13This is in spite of the higher temporary employment rate in Spain, due to its higher EPL on permanent
jobs vis-à-vis France.
10Yet, geographical mobility is much lower in Spain. A good starting point in docu-
menting this diﬀerence is home leaving. The average age at which young people leave the
parental home in France is around 24 years old against around 29 years old in Spain. An-
other striking disparity is that the fraction of people who have never moved after leaving
the parental home is equal to 23% in Spain but only 8% in France. Moreover, while 30%
of the French population has moved across regions, only 11% of Spaniards have done so.
Overall, the interregional migration rate for people aged 15-64 is 2.1% in France and only
0.2% in Spain, with a wider disparity for young people (15-24 years old): 3.8% in France
and 0.23% in Spain.14
Low interregional mobility has aﬀected the impact of the recession in Spain, since its
regions have been hit quite diﬀerently by the crisis. Regional employment destruction
growth rates of dependent employment, which range from -1% to -13.4% (2007:4-2009:3),
are closely related to the regional shares of employment in the construction industry, which
has plummeted during the recession (a 36% nationwide reduction of employment in this
sector with regional rates ranging from 18.7% to 54.7%). This strong link is illustrated by
the raw correlation coeﬃcient between the changes in total and construction employment
shares across Spanish regions, which is equal to 0.7.15
In what follows we argue that the strong dependence of the Spanish economy on the
construction sector since the late 1990s (11.9% of GDP and 13.3% of employment in 2007,
against 6.3% and 6.9% in France; Eurostat) is closely related to the existence of a dual
labor market. In eﬀect, as a result of Spain’s access to the euro area in the late 1990s
with a higher inﬂation rate than France, real interest rates fell by 6 pp., against 1.5 pp.
in France, fueling a strong investment boom. These new investment projects could have
taken place in either high value-added industries (like, e.g., ICT in Finland) or in low-value
added ones. Investors bet rationally for the latter for at least two reasons. On the one
hand, the rigid permanent contracts would have been inadequate to specialize in more
innovative sectors, since higher labor ﬂexibility is required to accommodate the higher
degree of uncertainty typically associated with producing higher value-added goods (Saint-
Paul, 1997). On the other hand, there was a large increase in the relative endowment
14The home-leaving ﬁgure corresponds to 2007, from the Labor Force Survey, see Eurostat (2009),
Figure 2.1. The subsequent ﬁgures are for 2005, from the analysis of the 2005 Eurobarometer by Van-
denbrande et al. (2006), Figures 20, 23, 2 and 3, and Table 2, respectively. Lastly, the interregional
migration rate corresponds to 2003, from OECD (2005).
15These ﬁgures leave out the Balearic Islands, which have an abnormally high employment level in
2009:3 due to seasonal factors related to the turism industry.
11of unskilled labor in Spain over that period. The higher availability of low-skilled jobs
through very ﬂexible contracts since the mid-1980s led to a high dropout rate of youth
from compulsory education (from 18% in 1990 to 32% in 1997) and subsequently to a huge
inﬂow of unskilled immigrants (implying a 10 pp. increase in the foreign population rate).
Hence, as a result of this relative abundance of less-skilled labor, most ﬁrms, especially
small and middle-sized ones, adopted technologies which where complementary with this
type of workers, leading to a boom in the construction sector.
Low geographical mobility is a source of mismatch and higher equilibrium unemploy-
ment via reallocation rather than conventional aggregate shocks (Layard et al., 1991).
This has become quite apparent in the aftermath of the recession in Spain, where unem-
ployment rate dispersion has sharply increased. The range between the lowest and the
highest regional unemployment rates, which was equal to 10.3 pp. in 2007:4, has risen to
15.6 pp. in 2009:4, whereas the standard deviation of those rates increased from 3 to 5
over that period.16 In sharp contrast, that range only increased in France from 9.6 pp. to
11.3 pp., while the standard deviation hardly changed, from 1.3 to 1.4.17
Geographical mobility depends on many factors, both economic and non-economic. In-
stitutional determinants of regional divergence in incomes and unemployment rates surely
play a role. For instance, Bentolila and Dolado (1991) found, for 1962-1986 (roughly a
pre-temporary employment period in Spain), that if the national unemployment rate dou-
bled (from 10% to 20%, not far from the current situation), the elasticity of interregional
migration ﬂows to regional wage and unemployment diﬀerentials halved. This estimate
is likely to be similar nowadays. On the other hand, Rupert and Wasmer (2009), echoing
earlier work by Oswald (1999), highlight the role of housing regulations in accounting
for diﬀerences in unemployment between Europe and the US. The Spanish rental market
works very poorly and is underdeveloped, representing only 12% of the housing market,
against 40% in France. Therefore, it clearly hampers regional migration (Barceló, 2006).
This is due to various institutional factors, in particular a legal structure that favors ten-
ants vs. landowners and an income tax system which heavily subsidizes owner-occupied
housing (Lopez-Garcia, 2004).
Moreover, like in the case of industrial specialization, diﬀerences in EPL may be a
16This was even stronger for workers aged 16 to 24 years old. The lowest-highest unemployment rate
diﬀerence increased from 19.4 to 24.7 and the standard deviation from 4.6 to 6.3.
17France: Labor Force Survey, BDM Macro-economic Database (www.bdm.insee.fr). Spain: Labor
Force Survey (www.ine.es).
12concomitant event to diﬀerences in labor mobility. On the one hand, there is evidence
that the widespread use of temporary contracts may reduce regional migration despite its
potentially beneﬁcial eﬀect on job creation. For example, using individual data for Spain,
Antolín and Bover (1997) found that temporary employment reduces the likelihood of
interregional migration. The insight is that a temporary job in a diﬀerent region does
not provide much job security whereas migrating means giving up, to a large extent, the
support of family networks, which are a key insurance mechanism in Southern Mediter-
ranean countries (Bentolila and Ichino, 2008). In a similar vein, Becker et al. (2010)
ﬁnd, with a sample of 13 European countries over 1983-2004, that youth job insecurity
discourages home-leaving, whereas parental job insecurity encourages it. Thus, to the
extent that permanent and temporary contracts are roughly held by older and younger
workers, respectively, the much higher EPL gap in Spain would be consistent with its
much lower home-leaving rate.
Overall, the above evidence indicates that the Great Recession is likely to have induced
a much larger increase in mismatch in Spain than in France. Indeed, the Spanish Beveridge
curve, plotted in Figure 2, conﬁr m st h a tt h i sd i ﬀerential eﬀect may have been rather
relevant. While there seems to be a stable relationship from 1994 to 2007, there is a large
outward shift during the Great Recession of both the vacancy rate and the unemployment
rate, indicating growing mismatch.18 For France, data are not available on vacancy stocks,
only on ﬂows. Yet, though not reported (but available upon request), unlike in Spain,
these ﬂows show no indication, of an outward shift in the French Beveridge curve from
1997 until 2009.
4M o d e l
This section presents our search and matching model, inspired by previous work by
Blanchard and Landier (2002) and Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002), where the seminal
Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) model with endogenous job destruction is extended to allow
for the distinction between temporary and permanent jobs entailing diﬀerent dismissal
c o s t sa n da d v a n c en o t i c ep e r i o d s .
18Unemployment is expressed as a percentage of the labor force whereas vacancy is in per thousand.
The ﬁgures in the graph are adapted from results in Bouvet (2009) spliced with survey data from the
Encuesta de Coyuntura Laboral (www.mtin.es/estadisticas/ecl/Ecl22010/SER/index.htm), which start
in 2000.
134.1 Model setup
The main features of the model are as follows. First, there is a continuum of inﬁnitely-
lived risk-neutral workers and ﬁrms, with a common discount rate r>0.T h em e a s u r eo f
workers is normalized to 1.
Job matches have an idiosyncratic productivity distribution F(ε),d r a w no v e rt h e
support [ε,ε].19 The idiosyncratic productivity shocks follow a Poisson distribution with
incidence rate μ. In line with Pissarides (2000), it is assumed for simplicity that all new
jobs start at the highest productivity ε.20
There are two types of jobs, temporary and permanent, both endowed with the same
productivity distribution. Trying to mimic realistic wage bargaining procedures, it is
assumed that wages are only renegotiated in permanent jobs but not in temporary jobs,
where wages are often ﬁxed for the whole duration of the contract. Unemployed workers
have access to temporary jobs with probability p, exogenously set as EPL policy, and to
initial permanent jobs with probability (1 − p). Temporary jobs are terminated with per
unit of time probability λ,a tw h i c hp o i n tﬁrms can either convert them to permanent jobs
or destroy them at no cost. A new value of productivity is drawn when the conversion
takes place.
There are two constraints to destroy permanent jobs. First, there are red-tape ﬁring
costs f, to be directly interpreted as the EPL gap under the previous assumption that
termination of temporary contracts entail no red-tape ﬁring costs. Secondly, time is needed
to destroy permanent jobs: when an employer wishes to destroy this type of jobs, there
is a ﬁring permission which arrives at a Poisson rate σ (Garibaldi, 1998). This ﬁring
permission typically captures not only advance notice, but also the uncertain time needed
to settle legal disputes. Between the date at which the employer decides to destroy the
job and the date at which the authorization arrives, we assume that the productivity of
the job is lowest possible, i.e., equal to ε , and that the interim wage equals the average
wage in the economy, ω (see the deﬁnition below) capturing in this fashion a prototypical
employment record in this economy.
Unemployment beneﬁts are denoted by b.N o t et h a tb o t hﬁring costs and unemploy-
19We introduce an aggregate shock, which corresponds to the Great Recession, rather than a sequence
of shocks as in L’Haridon and Malherbet (2009), Costain et al. (2010), or Sala et al. (2010).
20This assumption reduces the number of productivity cutoﬀ levels to just two (see equation PJD and
PJC below) which simpliﬁes considerably the analysis and calibration of the model, without qualitatively
aﬀecting its main implications.
14ment beneﬁts should be interpreted as monetary ﬂows in terms of the average wage, i.e.,
as fω and bω, though for short they will be respectively referred to as f and b hereafter.
There is a Cobb-Douglas matching function m(u,v)=m0uαv1−α àl aP i s s a r i d e s( 2 0 0 0 ) ,
with matching rates q(θ) for vacancies and θq(θ) for the unemployed. Thus, labor market
tightness is given by θ = v/u,w h e r ev and u are the masses of vacancies and unemploy-
ment, respectively. The degree of mismatch is captured by the shifter m0 such that a
lower value of m0 signiﬁes higher mismatch, that is, an outward shift in the Beveridge
curve. Finally, there is a ﬂow cost of keeping jobs vacant equal to h>0 per unit of time.
In terms of notation, subindices are as follows: t stands for a temporary job, 0 for the
beginning of a permanent job, p for a continuing permanent job, and a for jobs that wait
for the authorization to be destroyed.
Asset values at steady state are denoted J and V for employers, and W and U for
employees. They are as follows:
• V : Value to the ﬁrm of a vacant job,
• Jt(ε):V a l u et ot h eﬁrm of a temporary job with productivity ε,
• J0(ε):V a l u et ot h eﬁrm of a new permanent job with productivity ε,n o ty e ts u b j e c t
to ﬁring costs,
• Jp(ε):V a l u et ot h eﬁrm of a continuing permanent job with productivity ε,s u b j e c t
to both ﬁring cost f and advance notice
• Ja : Value to the ﬁrm of a permanent job under advance notice,
• U: Value to the worker of unemployment,
• Wt(ε): Value to the worker of a temporary job with productivity parameter ε,
• W0(ε): Value to the worker of a new permanent with productivity ε subject to ﬁring
costs f (recall that a new permanent job can previously be a temporary job),
• Wp(ε): Value to the worker of a continuing permanent job with productivity para-
meter ε,s u b j e c tt oﬁring costs f.
• Wa : Value to the worker of a permanent job under advance notice.
154.2 Bellman equations
T h eB e l l m a ne q u a t i o n sf o rt h eﬁrm’s asset values are as follows:








rJ0(ε)=ε − w0 (ε)+μ
Z ε
ε
max[Jp (x) − J0(ε),J a − J0(ε)]dF(x) (3)
rJp(ε)=ε − wp (ε)+μ
Z ε
ε
max[Jp (x) − Jp(ε),J a − Jp(ε)]dF(x) (4)
rJa = ε − ω − σ[f + Ja − V ] (5)
A c c o r d i n gt o( 1 ) ,k e e p i n gav a c a n tj o bi m p l i e saﬂow cost of h and returns a contact
with probability q(θ) in each period. Once the contact takes place, the employer-employee
pair sign a temporary contract with probability p or a new permanent contract with
probability 1 − p, both created at the maximal productivity level, ε. If a temporary
contract is signed, equation (2) implies that the employer obtains a ﬂow proﬁto fε − wt,
where wt is the pre-established wage for this type of contracts which does not depend
on productivity. After the productivity shock takes place, at rate μ,t h i st y p eo fj o b
—which yields an asset value to the employer of Jt(ε)— necessarily continues until the
arrival of the date at which it can be destroyed. This assumption reﬂects the fact that
employers are not allowed to layoﬀ workers on temporary contracts before the end of the
contract. Temporary contracts are terminated at rate λ.21 When a temporary contract
is terminated, the job can be either destroyed or converted into a permanent job. At the
date of the termination of the temporary contract, a new value of the productivity shock
is drawn in line with available evidence pointing out that workers’ productivity may be
diﬀerent under permanent and temporary contracts.22
The asset value to the employer of a new permanent job, ﬁlled either by an unemployed
worker or by a worker on a temporary contract, is J0(ε) which, according to (3), yields
a ﬂow proﬁto fε − w0 (ε). Once a productivity shock occurs at rate μ, the permanent
contract becomes a continuing one —with an asset value to the ﬁrm of Jp(ε)—i ft h ee m p l o y e r
21Assuming that the duration of temporary contracts is ﬁxed rather than random leads to more complex
formulations without changing the properties of the model.
22For example, Ichino and Riphahn (2005) have shown that the number of days of absence per week
increases signiﬁcantly once employment protection is granted at the end of probation periods.
16decides to keep the job, or it becomes a job under advance notice —with an asset value of
Ja, if the employer prefers to ﬁre the worker. Equation (4) indicates that the employer
with a continuing job obtains a ﬂow proﬁto fε−wp (ε), such that the only diﬀerence with
the value of a new job —deﬁn e db ye q u a t i o n( 3 ) —i st h a tt h ew o r k e rc a nn o wu s eb o t h
the ﬁring cost and the advance notice, Ja, as additional threats in the wage bargain. As
mentioned earlier, it is assumed that jobs under advance notice, whose value is deﬁned by
equation (5), have the lowest possible productivity ε and pay workers the average wage.
These assumptions are a simple way to account for the fact that workers under advance
notice generally provide low work eﬀort and are paid a wage that depends on their past
remuneration. Lastly, (5) also indicates that jobs under advance notice can be destroyed
at an incidence rate σ.
Turning now to workers, their corresponding Bellman equations are given by:
















max[Wp (x) − Wp(ε),W a − Wp(ε)]dF(x) (9)
rWa = ω + σ[U − Wa] (10)
Equation (6) shows that an unemployed worker enjoys a ﬂow earning b and gets in
contact with a vacancy at rate θq(θ), either of a temporary job or of a new permanent
job, with probabilities p and 1−p, respectively. Expressions (7) to (9) represent the asset
values to the worker of the diﬀerent jobs, and their interpretation is similar to those in
(2) to (4) with the ﬂow income being the respective wages. Finally, (10) represents the
asset value to the worker of being dismissed from a non-temporary job.
4.3 Surplus sharing
As is conventional in this type of models, the surplus is shared according to a Nash
b a r g a i ni nw h i c hw o r k e r sh a v eb a r g a i n i n gp o w e rβ ∈ [0,1]. This gives rise to the surplus
expressions:
St(¯ ε)=Jt(¯ ε) − V + Wt(¯ ε) − U (11)
17S0(ε)=J0(ε) − V + W0(ε) − U (12)
Sp(ε)=Jp(ε) − Ja + Wp(ε) − Wa (13)
w h e r et h es u r p l u sf o rt e m p o r a r yj o b si sd e ﬁned at it initial productivity level, ¯ ε, and those
of permanent jobs at the date where the new productivity shock ε arrives.
S i n c ew eh a v e
Wa + Ja =
ε + σ(U − f + V )
r + σ
the surplus of continuing permanent jobs can be rewritten as
Sp(ε)=Jp(ε) − V + f + Wp(ε) − U −
µ




The free-entry rule V =0implies:
h = q(θ)[pJt(ε)+( 1− p)J0(ε)] (15)
Therefore, since Ji(ε)=( 1− β)Si(ε), i = t,0, we get:
θh
1 − β
= θq(θ)[pSt (ε)+( 1− p)S0(¯ ε)] (16)
Bargaining, together with free entry, implies:
W0(ε) − U = βS0(ε)
J0(ε)=( 1 − β)S0(ε)
Wp(ε) − Wa(w)=βSp(ε)
Jp(ε) − Ja(w)=( 1 − β)Sp(ε)










where rU +σf −ε = b +θ
βh
1−β +σf −ε > 0 to ensure job destruction. Thus, the surplus
from a continuing permanent job is larger than the surplus from a new permanent job,
due to our previous assumption that the employer only has to pay the ﬁring cost and to
comply with the advance notice if the worker has been conﬁrmed in the job and not when
disagreement arises at the time of the ﬁrst encounter with the worker.
184.4 Job creation and job destruction
The previous expressions for the surpluses yield the productivity thresholds used by ﬁrms
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which shows that temporary jobs are destroyed more frequently than continuing perma-
nent jobs, because they are exempt from ﬁring costs. Moreover, the wedge between εc
and εd increases with f and σ.









for ε ≥ ε
d (19)
where (18) and (19) can be replaced into (PJD) to derive the following productivity






















This equation shows that the threshold productivity εd is an increasing function of
labor market tightness, θ,a n dad e c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no ft h eﬁring cost, f.24 The intuition
for the ﬁrst relationship is that a tighter labor market, by improving the value of unem-
ployment U, reduces the surplus, thus making the employer-worker pair more exacting
on how productive the match must be to compensate them for their outside options. As
23Notice that the job creation threshold does not exist for jobs ﬁlled by unemployed workers, since
these jobs are created at the maximal productivity.
24It can be also shown to be an increasing function of the average duration of the advance notice period
(1/σ), for values of f suﬃciently large, since sign(∂εd/∂σ)= sign(rU − ε − rf). The intuition for this
result is that, since the ﬁrm anticipates more ﬁring restrictions when conditions are bad, it becomes more
exacting (higher εd) as advance notice increases (as σ falls).
19regards the second relationship, it is consistent with the goal of ﬁring costs of reducing
the propensity to destroy jobs, implying that less productive jobs remain operative.










































Evaluation of both (21) and (18) at ε yields St(ε) and S0(ε), respectively, which can

















μ+r dF(x) − b −
βθh
1−β]




By replacing εc by εd in equation (JC), using equation (17), it is easy to show that,
along the JC locus, labor tightness θ is a decreasing function of the job destruction
productivity cutoﬀ εd. In other words, the lower the destruction threshold εd,t h el o n g e r
jobs last on average, which leads to a higher creation of vacancies. Conversely, for a given
value of εd,ah i g h e rﬁring cost f reduces the expected present value of jobs and therefore
hinders job creation.
In sum, besides the unemployment rate (see below), the steady-state equilibrium values
of the other three unknowns in our model, θ, εc,a n dεd, are found by solving the system
of equations given by (JC), (17) and (20). Equilibrium is depicted in Figure 3, where the
crossing of the JC (having replaced εc by εd) and PJD loci in the (θ, εd) space determines
the equilibrium values of these two variables, whereas (17) determines the equilibrium
value of εc. In Figure 4 we consider the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h eﬁring cost gap between
permanent and temporary workers. This is captured by a rise in f, which shifts the PJD
and JC schedules downwards and the PJC locus upwards.25 Firms unambiguously ﬁre
less permanent workers (lower εd), transform temporary contracts into permanent ones
less frequently (higher εc), and reduce labor market tightness (θ) for given values of the
productivity thresholds. Although in principle the conventional ambiguity on the eﬀect of









20ﬁring costs on unemployment holds, as a result of the lower job creation and destruction
rates, it will be shown below that, in a dual labor market which initially exhibits a high
gap in ﬁring costs, a further increase in f will raise unemployment. The intuition is that, if
the conversion rate from temporary to permanent contracts is low to start with, a further
rise in f exacerbates temporary workers’ turnover precisely when less vacancies are being
created. Thus, unemployment is likely to go up, as Blanchard and Landier (2002), and
Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) have pointed out before.
Figure 5, in turn, shows the eﬀect of a reduction in p, an EPL policy parameter which,
as mentioned earlier, is bound to be higher in Spain than in France because the laxer
restrictions in the use of temporary contracts and the higher weight of the construction
sector in Spain before the current recession. Now, the PJC and PJD loci remain unaﬀected
whereas the JC schedule shifts downwards, since job creation is hindered by the lower
availability of ﬂexible contracts. As a result, the equilibrium value of θ unambiguously
decreases whereas the two productivity cutoﬀ values fall. In other words, since decreasing
p lowers job creation, ﬁrms become less exacting about hiring and ﬁring, making job
turnover less intensive. As a result, despite the fall in θ, the impact of a reduction of
p on the unemployment rate is ambiguous. However, like before, if the economy has a
large ﬁring costs to start with, a reduction in p is likely to decrease temporary workers’
turnover, and this may reduce unemployment, as our quantitative simulations below show.
Finally, it is straightforward to check that either a rise in λ (i.e. a higher frequency in
the termination of temporary jobs) or a reduction in m0 (i.e. an increase in mismatch)
unambiguously lead to lower θ and higher unemployment.
4.5 Unemployment ﬂows
L e tu sd e n o t eb yNt the number of workers with a temporary contract, Np those with a
permanent contract not subject to advance notice, Na t h o s ew i t hap e r m a n e n tc o n t r a c t
subject to advance notice, and u the number of unemployed workers. Then we have:
˙ Nt = puθq(θ) − λNt
˙ Np =( 1 − p)uθq(θ)+λNt[1 − F(ε
c)] − μNpF(ε
d)
˙ Na = μNpF(ε
d) − σNa
˙ u = λF(ε
c)Nt + σNa − uθq(θ)
In steady state, the number of workers in the diﬀe r e n tt y p eo fj o b sa n dt h eu n e m p l o y -














































λσμF(εd)+θq(θ)[σμpF(εd)+λ[1 − pF(εc)][σ + μF(εd)]
(27)
This equation will serve us to illustrate the result that economies in which the EPL
gap is too large, unemployment will be higher than in those where the gap is smaller. For
that, ﬁr s tn o t i c et h a tu∗ increases ceteris paribus with the cutoﬀ productivity levels εd
and εc. Moreover, since according to (20) the direct eﬀect of a higher gap f is to increase
the wedge εc− εd,t h eh i g h e ri sf t h em o r el i k e l yi ti st h a tF(εc) À F(εd). Then, by
continuity, this argument implies the existence of a threshold value of the gap in ﬁring
costs, f, such that, for f>f, u∗ will increase with f. Heuristically, the insight for this
result is that, if the initial value of f is suﬃciently large, F(εc) will become the dominant
term when diﬀerentiating (27) with respect to f.26 Regarding the eﬀect of a reduction
in the proportion of temporary jobs p on unemployment, it is ambiguous as reﬂected by
the two counteracting terms in the denominator of (27) associated to p: σμF(εd),o nt h e




, on the other. However, using the same argument
as before, when f is suﬃciently large, F(εc) will dominate F(εd) in the diﬀerentiation of
(27) with respect to p,s ot h a tar e d u c t i o ni np lowers unemployment. The intuition this
time is that a lower p means restricting the use of temporary jobs which, in a economy
with large f, are destroyed more frequently than permanent jobs.
26The exact value of f depends on the other parameter values in a rather cumbersome way but the
intuition given above remains valid.
224.6 Wages
As mentioned earlier, wages are set according to a Nash bargain in which workers have
bargaining power β ∈ [0,1]. While they can be renegotiated on permanent jobs, we
assume that this is not the case for temporary jobs where the wage wt is taken to be
invariant throughout the length of the contract. Nash bargaining yields:
(1 − β)[Wt(¯ ε) − U]=β [Jt(¯ ε) − V ] (28)
(1 − β)[W0(ε) − U]=β[(J0(ε) − V ] (29)
(1 − β)[Wp(ε) − Wa]=β[(Jp(ε) − Ja] (30)




r+σ ,a n dWa = ω+σU
r+σ ,w eg e tt h e
following expressions for the wages:
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(1 − β)b (33)
I tc a nb ee a s i l yc h e c k e dt h a tw0(ε) <w p(ε) and w0(ε) <w t.N o t i c et h a t ,w h e nσ →∞
(i.e. no advance notice), wp(ε)=wt + β[rf − (ε − ε)], so that the wage of permanent
workers is not necessarily larger than the wage of temporary workers because the latter
always start at the highest productivity level. Nonetheless, the larger is f the more likely
it is that wp(ε) >w t. Similar qualitative results hold when σ is ﬁnite.
Finally, to compute the average wage in steady state, ω, let us denote by N0 the
number of temporary jobs that have just been created with productivity ¯ ε and that have
not yet been hit by a productivity shock since their creation, and by N0t the corresponding
number of permanent jobs that have not been hit by a shock since they were transformed
from temporary jobs. Then:
˙ N0 =( 1 − p)uθq(θ) − μN0
˙ N0t = λNtp[1 − F(ε
c)] − μN0t



















1 − u − Na
(34)
For example, assuming that F(.) is the c.d.f. of a uniform distribution U[ε,ε] and that
there is no advance notice, ω is given by:
ω =
βhθ(1 − u)+β ε(Nt + N0)+β ε+εc
2 Not + β ε+εd
2 (Np − N0 − N0t)
(1 − u)(1− b(1 − β)) + f(μ + r)(N0 + Not) − frNp
(35)
5 Accounting for the impact of the crisis
In this section, we ﬁrst show how we calibrate a number of key parameters in the model
and then discuss the results of a simulation exercise where we try to ascertain the extent
to which the diﬀerence in EPL regulation between Spain and France can account for the
strikingly diﬀerent evolution of their respective unemployment rates during the crisis.
5.1 Calibration of the model
The length of a model period is chosen to be one quarter. Some of the values of the
model’s parameters can be imputed directly from data, but others need to be endogenously
calibrated to ﬁt a set of labor market magnitudes. Our reference period for the calibration
is the latter part of the boom preceding the recession, namely 2005:1-2007:4. The reason
is that the unemployment rates in both countries were similar at that time and our goal
is precisely to let the model explain the unemployment rate in the bad state (after the
crisis) relative to the good state (before the crisis).
Parameter values are presented in Table 2. The interest rate r is set at 1% per quarter.
As in most of the literature (see, e.g., Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001), we set the value
for both the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment (α)a n d
bargaining power (β)e q u a lt o0.5.
As for the unemployment beneﬁt indicator b, we use statutory replacement rates cor-
rected for beneﬁt coverage, setting it to 55% for France and 58% for Spain. Indicators
f, σ,a n dp are chosen to represent each country’s EPL. As regards f, recall that it
reﬂects red-tape ﬁring costs. Kramarz and Michaud (2010) calculate the average ﬁring
cost for permanent workers in France to be around one year’s wages, with red-tape costs
24accounting for one third of this amount (i.e. 1.33 quarters). For Spain, we compute it as
the (weighted) diﬀerence between actually paid severance (45 days of wages per year of
service, in either individual or collective dismissals), which is induced by labor courts and
authorities, and statutory severance for dismissals based on economic reasons (20 days).
Making use of observed employment tenures yields a value of 2 quarters. Thus, the value
of f for Spain is 50% higher than in France. In contrast, the average advance notice
period (1/σ) is longer in France, where it is set to last four months (σ =0 .75), than in
Spain, where it is set at 3 weeks (σ =4 .3).27
Parameter p, which represents the proportion of newly created contracts that are
temporary, is set to 0.85 in France and 0.91 in Spain in the boom. As already indicated,
one of the main reasons for the larger value of p in Spain is the much higher weight of
employment in the construction industry during the reference period which, as argued
before, has been an important source of hiring of temporary workers in this country.
Parameter λ, which captures the (inverse of) the duration of temporary contracts, is set
equal to 0.88 both in France and Spain before the crisis, in line with the information
drawn from their Labor Force Survey (LFS).28
To simplify computations, the idiosyncratic productivity shock is assumed to be uni-
formly distributed, with ε =0and ¯ ε =1 . Finally, to uncover the values of the remaining
three parameters (h, m0,a n dμ), for which no direct information is available, we calibrate
them to match the outcomes of the following three equations deﬁning key labor market
variables (targets) related to temporary and permanent employment jobs and the overall
unemployment rate in each economy, which are computed using the French and Spanish
LFS. The ﬁrst equation refers to the destruction rate of permanent jobs, which is deﬁned










Secondly, we use the share of temporary jobs in the total stock of jobs (in steady
27In France, the advance notice period is 2 months but it increases to 3 months in many collective
agreements and above 6 months for collective layoﬀs. Further, the fact that employers ought to interview
the worker often implies that it takes around one more month before the employer can send the letter
letting the worker know that he/she is ﬁred. In Spain, Law 45/2002 , discussed in Section 3.1, has reduced
substantially the advance notice period since 2002.










λ[σ + μF(εd)][1 − pF(εc)] + pσμF(εd)
(37)
Lastly, we use the steady-state unemployment rate given in equation (27).
O n c et h em o d e lh a sb e e nc a l i b r a t e dt or e p r o d u ce the stylized facts during the reference
period, we obtain simulations for the recession allowing for adverse changes in the pro-
ductivity distribution and possibly in mismatch. These simulations are obtained for two
speciﬁcations of the average wage ω applied to compute the monetary ﬂows of the ﬁring
cost and the unemployment beneﬁt during the recession. In the ﬁrst one we consider that
ω corresponds to the contemporaneous calibrated average wage (i.e. in the bad state). In
the second speciﬁcation ω takes its previously calibrated value in the good state. This is
meant to mimic the fact in reality unemployment beneﬁts and severance pay are linked to
workers’ previous experience and tenure, respectively. For notational convenience, these
two speciﬁcations will be labeled as the endogenous wage model and the ﬁxed f—bm o d e l
respectively.
5.2 Simulation results
In this section we summarize the main results of several simulation exercises. We present
targets (actual data) and outcomes (simulated data) for both countries in the expansionary
and recessionary periods, using the two alternative ways of computing ω just described.
For the sake of brevity, however, we will mainly focus on the results stemming from the
ﬁxed f—bm o d e l ,w h i c hw es e ea sam o r er e a l i s t i cs e t u p .
Table 3 presents the data (target values) and the steady-state value of the unem-
ployment rate and temporary contract share during the expansion (based on data for
2005:1-2007:4) and the recession (2008:1-2009:4).29 As can be observed, for the reference
expansionary period, for both countries we are able to match fairly well the chosen target
variables, especially the unemployment and the temporary employment rates.
We follow two approaches in running the simulations for the recession. First, we
consider a baseline simulation where the only degree of freedom in matching targets during
the slump is a parameter controling the severity of the productivity shock through a shift
29Given the trending behavior of the unemployment and the temporary employment rates, especially
in Spain, in a few instances we have replaced the period average by a given data point which we see as
more representative of the corresponding business cycle.phase.
26in its distribution, whereas all other parameters in the model remain the same as in the
preceding expansion. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the productivity distribution is shifted
by a multiplicative factor γ, so that productivity is assumed to be uniformly distributed
with support γ[ε, ε] and γ is calibrated to match the required three targets during the
recession. Secondly, we compute an alternative simulation where, besides the severity of
t h es h o c k ,w ea l l o wf o ra n o t h e rm o d el parameter to change, namely, m0.T h i si sm e a n t
to allow reallocation shocks to play a role in capturing, e.g., mismatch created by the
collapse of the construction industry in Spain, so as to check if there is any improvement
in the overall matching of the targets.
Table 3 (row 4), shows that the baseline simulation allows us to match fairly well
the unemployment and temporary employment rates for France during the recession with
av a l u eo fγ equal to 0.90, namely and adverse shift of 10% in average productivity.
Notice, however, that this exercise makes sense only if the unemployment rate reaches its
steady state value fast enough. Figure 6 shows that this is indeed the case: the speed
of adjustment of the unemployment rate is high in France. Most of the adjustment to
the new steady state after the negative shock at the origin of the recession is made in 6
months (25 weeks).30
Table 3 (row 8), shows that the baseline simulation for Spain with γ =0 .77 —i.e. a
much more adverse shock than in France— matches the value of the unemployment rate
during the recession well but it fails badly in matching the share of temporary jobs, which
has fallen from 33.3% to 27% whereas the simulation yields an increase to almost 38%.
Given this unsatisfactory result and the arguments posed in Section 3.4 about the likely
increase in mismatch following the negative aggregate shock in Spain, we perform the
alternative simulation where we allow for a newly calibrated value of m0 together with a
new γ. This calibration exercise yields an increase in the degree of mismatch, captured
by a reduction of m0 from its initial value of 2.5 to 1.5 and a similar value for γ to that
obtained for France, namely γ =0 .87. Notice that the outward shift in the Beveridge
curve illustrated in Figure 2 reﬂects reallocation distortions rather than aggregate shocks
and hence the correct interpretation of the recession in Spain would be a combination of
30The dynamics are easy to compute because the core of the model is forward looking. As soon as the
economy is hit by an unfavorable shift in the distribution of productivity, the thresholds jump to their
new stady-state values. We then essentially look at the adjustment of the stocks given the new ﬂows,
noting that some permanent workers will be laid oﬀ even without having been hit by an “idiosyncratic”
shock because of the shift in the thresholds.
27both types of shocks. In line with the discussion in Section 3.4, higher mismatch leads
to a rise in unemployment through lower labor mobility driven both by the higher risk
involved in the increasing destruction of temporary jobs and the rigid regulations aﬀecting
the Spanish rental market. In other words, workers who have lost their jobs in regions
with high unemployment, because of the collapse of the construction industry, ﬁnd it very
costly to move to other regions where unemployment is lower. The results reported in
the last row of Table 3 for this alternative scenario show a substantial improvement in
matching the target on temporary work (27% in the data vs. 27.9% in the simulation),
while the much higher unemployment rate remains satisfactorily reproduced.
Figure 7 represents the transitional dynamics of the unemployment rate for Spain.
As in France, it turns out that the speed of adjustment to the steady state is very fast.
Accordingly, comparing steady states in the expansion and the recession allows us to
account well for changes in the unemployment rates in both countries.
5.2.1 Counterfactual simulations: Spain with French EPL regulations
Once we have managed to get a calibration that behaves well in both the good and bad
states, we can use this model to run counterfactual simulations aimed at gauging the share
of the increase in unemployment induced by the recession in Spain that can be attributed
to diﬀerences in its EPL vis-à-vis France’s. In other words, we carry out this counterfactual
simulation by computing what would have been the increase in unemployment during the
Great Recession had Spain adopted French EPL just before the slump started.31
We interpret the adoption of French EPL in two ways, namely in a broad and in a
narrow sense. First, it is interpreted as involving not only the direct eﬀect on worker
turnover of adopting a lower value of f but also the related indirect eﬀects of a reduction
in f on the use of temporary contracts. A lower f is bound to lead to many more
conversions as well as more direct hiring of workers under permanent contracts. Thus,
under this broad interpretation, besides using the French value of f,w ea l s oi m p u t et o
Spain the French share of hires on temporary jobs, p. This can also be interpreted as a
tightening of the enforcement of the criteria for allowing the use of temporary contracts.
The results from these simulations are presented in Table 4. To compute the coun-
terfactual rise in Spanish unemployment, we follow a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach
31Notice that this assumption about the timing of the adoption of French EPL in Spain implies that
we do not need to re-calibrate the model in the good state.
28where we compare steady-state unemployment before and after the negative aggregate
shock in France and in Spain. For instance, for the ﬁxed f—bmodel under the broad
interpretation of EPL, the ﬁrst row in panel A of Table 4 shows the result of subtracting
from the overall change in unemployment, 7.43 pp., the change predicted had Spain had
the French parameters, namely, 4.05 pp. The implication is that the recession would have
raised the unemployment rate in Spain by 3.38 pp. less (i.e. about 45% of the actual
increase) had Spain adopted French EPL rather than kept its own. The endogenous wage
model provides a lower outcome of 1.42 pp. (about 20% less unemployment than the
actual increase) revealing that higher wage ﬂexibility reduces the adverse eﬀects of the
EPL gap and the corresponding widespread use of temporary contracts on unemployment.
However, it is likely that the endogenous wage model overestimates downward wage ﬂex-
ibility since, according to the simulations for this case real wages fall by 0.2%, while in
reality they increased by 2.5% during the slump (see Table 1).
Regarding the dynamics, Figure 8 depicts three transition paths of the Spanish un-
employment rate in the recession for the ﬁxed f—bmodel. Instead of depicting the
unemployment rate in levels, we plot the deviations of the unemployment rate following
the recession from the steady-state value in the good state, i.e. u =1 0 .2% (see the third
panel in Table 3). The solid line corresponds to the simulation with Spanish parameters
whereas the dashed line captures the case where the values of f and p are replaced by the
French ones. As can be observed, the dynamics in the counterfactual scenario exhibit an
overshooting of about 2 pp. in the short-run after the adverse productivity shock hits the
economy. The reason is that a reduction in the EPL gap, concerning both ﬁring costs and
the use of temporary contracts, exacerbates job destruction in the short run during the
recession by making layoﬀs less expensive. Speciﬁc a l l y ,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h ep r o d u c t i v i t y
cutoﬀ for job destruction, εd,f r o m0 . 7 6t o0 . 8 6i n d u c e st h eo vershooting. However, in the
long run, this is oﬀset by much higher job creation, so that unemployment goes down to
a new steady state with the properties discussed above: i.e. about 3.4 pp. larger when
Spain keeps its own EPL rather than having adopted the French one.
Next, panel B in Table 4 presents the results of the simulation under the narrow
interpretation of French EPL adoption, i.e. Spanish unemployment with French layoﬀ
costs but the Spanish regulation of temporary jobs. The line with crosses of Figure 8
depicts the transitional dynamics of the unemployment rate in this case. The result of
the counterfactual increase in Spanish unemployment, is quite smaller than before. This
29result stresses the importance of the regulation of ﬁxed temporary jobs in combination
with a reduction in the EPL gap, especially because, as stressed in Section 3.4, we believe
that there should be a close link among changes in f and in p. Endogeneizing p as a
function of f is bound to be hard in this type of equilibrium search and matching models
but it remains a relevant item in our research agenda.
Finally, panel C in Table 4 reports the results obtained in the converse simulation
exercise, now addressing the question: By how much would French unemployment have
risen during the recession had France adopted Spanish EPL? In line with our previous
discussion, we use the broad interpretation of Spanish EPL in terms of the bundle of
parameters (f,p). The result is that, instead of the observed rise of 1.5 pp., the French
unemployment rate would have risen by 3.1 pp., that is 1.9 pp. more than with their own
regulations when the average wage ω applied to f and b remains as in the good state,
and by only 1.3 pp. under the endogenous wage model. Therefore, these result conﬁrm
the previous counterfactual ﬁndings for Spain that a higher (f,p) combination induces a
larger increase in unemployment to a given negative shock.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we explore how much of the signiﬁcantly larger increase in unemployment
in Spain vis-à-vis France during the ongoing recession can be accounted for the diﬀerence
in EPL between the two countries. We have argued that the larger gap between the
dismissal costs of workers with permanent and temporary contracts in Spain as compared
to France has led to diﬀerent labor mobility and industrial specialization, huge ﬂows of
temporary workers into and out of unemployment and, as a result, large job losses during
the Great Recession.
To carry out this task, inspired by previous work by Blanchard and Landier (2002)
and Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002), we have used a search and matching model that
extends Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) to allow for the distinction between temporary and
permanent jobs entailing diﬀerent dismissal costs. After calibrating the parameters with
data for the two economies, we simulate the model to replicate a few key labor market
magnitudes for the expansion (2005-2007) and recession periods (2008-2009).
Subsequently we undertake several counterfactual exercises involving the key parame-
ters capturing employment protection and industry composition in the model, which we
30interpret to be closely related. Imputing the French-economy levels of a couple of subsets
of these parameters to the Spanish economy yields a robust result, namely that the cur-
rent recession would have raised the unemployment rate in Spain by about 45% less than
the observed rise (8 pp. on average between 2005-07 and 2008-2009) had Spain adopted
French EPL institutions rather than kept its own. It is worth noting that this could be
interpreted as a conservative estimate of the true eﬀect since we have only considered the
eﬀect of red-tape ﬁring costs in our exercise. Moreover, if wage rigidity were considered
to be higher than that implied by standard Nash bargaining, then it is likely that the
contribution of the overall gap in EPL to the surge in Spanish unemployment during the
Great Recession could have been even larger.
Recently there have been several policy initiatives in Europe defending the idea of elim-
inating the ﬁring cost gap through the introduction of a single labor contract. Among
these proposals are those of Blanchard and Tirole (2003) and Cahuc and Kramarz (2004)
for France, Boeri and Garibaldi (2008) and Ichino (2009) for Italy, and a manifesto signed
by 100 academic economists, see Andrés et al. (2008), for Spain. While not identical in
their details, all these proposals highlight the negative eﬀects induced by the permanent-
temporary contract divide. As a result, they all advocate the elimination of temporary
contracts and the introduction of a single labor contract with severance pay that is in-
creasing with seniority in the job.32 The results in this paper, by ﬁnding a rather sizable
impact of the ﬁring cost gap on the rise in unemployment during the crisis, provide some
support for these proposals.
32For a speciﬁc proposal of a single contract for Spain and its consequences in terms of expected
protection and job stability, see Garcia-Perez (2009).
31Appendix
Table A1. Employment protection legislation in France and Spain
Permanent contracts Temporary contracts
France
* Notice period 1 month if 6<seniority (months)< 24
2 months if seniority (months) 24
* Severance pay
1. Economic 6 days of wages pys. (20% of wage) 3 days of wages pys.
reasons +0.08 days’ wages pys.>10 yrs
(1/15 of monthly wage)
2. Personal Minimum seniority: 1 year
reasons 3 days of wages pys. (10% of wage)
(before July 2008) +0.04 days’ wages pys.>10 yrs
Observations Personalized plan Max. duration: 24 months
for up to 12 months Restricted to 9 cases
(see text)
Spain
* Notice period 1 month
* Severance pay
1. Economic 20 days of wages pys. 8 days of wages pys.
reasons Max. seniority coverage: 12 months (0 days in some cases,
see text)
Observations Collective dismissal requires Max. duration: 24 months
administrative approval Unrestricted
2. Unfair 45 days of wages pys.
dismissal Max. seniority coverage: 42 months
Note: “pys.” means per year of service.
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Figure 1: Unemployment rate in France and Spain, 1976-2010
Figure 2: Beverigde curve for Spain, 1994-2010
36Table 1: Labor market evolutions in France and Spain
Levels (%) 1998:1 2007:4 2009:4
1. Unemployment France 10.3 7.5 9.7
Spain 15.2 8.7 18.9
2. Fixed-term employment1 France 13.8 14.3 13.1
Spain 33.3 30.9 25.1
3. Hours of work2 France 40.7 37.7 37.4
Spain 38.8 39.0 39.1
Annual growth rates (%)3 1998:1-2007:4 2008:1-2009:4
4. Gross Domestic Product France 2.3 -1.1
Spain 3.7 -2.2
5. Labor force France 0.8 0.9
Spain 3.3 1.3
6. Employment France 1.1 -0.3
Spain 4.2 -4.6
7. Private non-agricultural employees:
(a) Total France 1.5 -1.6
Spain 5.6 -5.7
(b) Construction France 2.4 -1.8
Spain 8.1 -19.8
(c) Manufacturing France -0.7 -3.2
Spain 2.0 -10.8
(d) Market services France 2.2 -1.1
Spain 6.8 -0.9
8. Real hourly earnings4 France 1.3 1.1
Spain 0.3 2.5
9. Hiring on temporary contracts5 France 78.6 83.3
Spain 90.5 89.6
Notes: 1 As a share of employees. 2 Full-time employees. 3 Computed as annual rates of end-
o f - p e r i o do ns t a r t - o fp e r i o dq u a r t e r l yl e v e l s . 4 Deﬂated by GDP Deﬂator, seasonally adjusted.
5 Average share over the corresponding period.
Sources: (1),(4)-(6), OECD Economic Outlook Database (www.oecd.org); (2),(3) Euro-
stat Statistics Database (epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu); (7), INSEE BDM Macroeconomic Data-
base (www.bdm.insee.fr) for France and INE, Encuesta de Población Activa (www.ine.es)
for Spain; (8) OECD Main Economic Indicators Database (www.oecd.org), (9) ACOSS
(www.acoss.urssaf.fr) for France and Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración, Boletín de Estadísti-
cas Laborales (www.mtin.es).
37Figure 3: Labor market equilibrium
38Figure 4: Eﬀe c t so fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h eﬁring cost (f)
Figure 5: Eﬀects of a reduction in the proportion hires on temporary contracts (p)
39Table 2: Calibrated and estimated parameters1
France Spain
Standard parameters:
Interest rate r 0.01 0.01
Matching function elasticity α 0.50 0.50
Worker bargaining power β 0.50 0.50
Institutional parameters:
Unemployment beneﬁtr e p l a c e m e n t er a t e b 0.55 0.58
Severance pay for permanent employees f 1.33 2.00
Dual labor market ﬂow rates:
Probability of hiring into a temporary job p 0.85 0.91
Probability of temporary contract ending λ 0.88 0.88
Parameters estimated by indirect inference:
Cost of keeping jobs vacant h 0.50 0.25
Matching eﬃciency level in expansion m0 1.50 2.50
Matching eﬃciency level in recession m0
0 1.50 1.50
Incidence rate of productivity shocks μ 0.04 0.09
Lower bound of productivity shock ε 0.00 0.00
Shocks multiplicative shift factor in recession γ 0.90 0.87
A d v a n c en o t i c er a t e σ 0.75 4.30
1 Reference period: 2005:1-2007:4.
40Table 3: Simulation results




1. Data 0.0860 0.0150 0.1260
2. Model 0.0854 0.0305 0.1137
France - Recession
3. Data 0.0980 0.0130 0.1250
4. Model 0.0973 0.0304 0.1145
Spain - Expansion
5. Data 0.1020 0.0470 0.3330
6. Model 0.1022 0.0655 0.3300
Spain - Recession
7. Data 0.1790 0.0400 0.2700
8. Baseline 0.1736 0.0641 0.3793
9. Alternative 0.1765 0.0611 0.2796
41Table 4: Diﬀerential increase in unemployment in Spain induced by the recession explained
by diﬀerences with France in the alternative simulation (percentage points)
∆uSP ∆uSP(FR) ∆uSP—∆uSP(FR)
A .S p a i nw i t hF r e n c hE P L :f and p
*F i x e df − b model 7.43 4.05 3.38
* Endogenous wage model 7.27 5.85 1.42
B .S p a i nw i t hF r e n c hE P L :f
*F i x e df − b model 7.43 6.13 1.30
* Endogenous wage model 7.27 7.28 -0.01
∆uFR ∆uFR(SP) ∆uFR—∆uFR(SP)
C. France with Spanish EPL: f and p
*F i x e df − b model 1.19 3.08 -1.90
* Endogenous wage model 1.28 2.58 -1.30
Note: ∆uSP denotes the change in unemployment explained by the model simulated
for the Spanish economy and ∆uSP(FR) the change in unemployment explained by the
model simulated for the Spanish economy with the indicated set of parameter values
corresponding to the simulated French economy. The mirror deﬁnitions apply to ∆uFR
and ∆uFR(SP).












Figure 6: Simulated change in unemployment rate in France (period in weeks)
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Figure 8: Change in unemployment rate in Spain with Spanish EPL (solid line), with
French layoﬀ costs and French regulation of temporary jobs (dotted line), with French
layoﬀ costs and Spanish regulation of temporary jobs (line with crosses), (period in weeks)
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